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Abstract 
 
Purpose: The paper first reviews Sukuk risk classification schemes based on extending and 
adapting the risk classification schemes of conventional finance. It is then argued that risk 
classification schemes based on Sukuk structure provide significant insights into Sukuk risk 
not obtainable from conventional schemes. This is because Sukuk structure risk classification 
schemes link Sukuk risk more directly to the fundamental causal factors creating those risks. 
These links are less evident in conventional risk classification schemes. It is hypothesised that 
Sukuk structure risk factors will prove to be highly significant in multifactor expected return 
regressions. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The paper argues that, given the paucity of the empirical 
data currently available to researchers in Islamic finance, greater care needs to be taken in 
hypothesis development than is necessary in conventional finance. The limited data available 
should be used for testing hypotheses and not ‘wasted’ in hypothesis formation. Through a 
meta-analysis of the existing literature on Sukuk risk it is hypothesised that Sukuk structure 
risks will be highly significant in explaining Sukuk returns and returns volatilities in empirical 
tests. 
Findings:  The main Sukuk structures, debt based, equity based, assets based, agency based, 
and hybrid structures, arise directly from the requirement of Sukuk to conform to the Shariah 
and to the fundamental ethical principles of Islamic finance and business. Further, Sukuk risk 
profiles are directly related to Sukuk structures. Thus, Sukuk structure risks are essentially 
Shariah risks. The paper presents a Sukuk risk classification matrix based on an evaluation of 
Sukuk structure risks. 
Research limitations/implications: The findings on the relation of Sukuk risks to Sukuk 
structures require corroboration by rigorous empirical tests. 
Social implications: The paper contributes to work on the creation of evidence based risk 
management techniques in Islamic finance and to the expansion of ethical financial 
management. 
Originality/value: The paper is one of the early detailed academic studies on the evaluation of 
risks arising from Sukuk structures. 
Paper type: Literature review and hypothesis development paper. 
   Page 3 of 29 
Keywords: Islamic banking, Islamic finance, Sukuk, risk, Sukuk structures, Sukuk structure 
risk factors. 
  
   Page 4 of 29 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The expected returns model research programme 
The paper reviews and evaluates the risks associated with Sukuk, and in particular with 
risks arising from differences in Sukuk structure. 
This research is set within a wider research programme, the eventual aim of which is to 
apply to Sukuk the expected returns models that have proved to be successful in the analysis 
of equities and conventional bonds (Haugen and Baker (1996), Pagas (2008)). 
An expected returns model, an ER model, is a multifactor risk model of the form: 
 
E(RA) = cA + 1,A  F1 +  2,A  F1 + … +  n,A  Fn  + A  (Equation 1) 
 
E(RA) is the expected return of security A, cA is a constant term, Fk is the k
th risk factor, 
k,A is the exposure of security A to the kth risk factor, and A is an error term. 
ER models have a mathematical form similar to the more well-known arbitrage pricing 
models, APT models. However, ER models and APT models differ fundamentally in terms of 
their motivations and interpretations. In APT models all of the risk factors, Fk, are economic 
risk factors, i.e. factors such as CAPM s and unexpected changes in oil prices, interest rates, 
and industrial production that affect the fundamental value of the real assets underlying the 
financial security A. Typically, from around three to seven risk factors are used in APT models. 
ER models, on the other hand, include two kinds of risk factors. Firstly, the economic risk 
factors used in APT models are also used in ER models. However, ER models also include 
behavioural risk factors, i.e. risk factors arising from the systematically irrational behaviour 
identified and investigated in the literature in behavioural finance. For example, high earnings-
to-price, dividends-to-price, sales-to-price, and book-value to market-value ratios can be 
interpreted as proxies for security A’s exposure to the investors’ overreaction factor 
(Lakonishok, et al, 2002). Typically, ER models include at least twenty economic and 
behavioural risk factors, and frequently many more. 
In the academic finance literature APT models have been studied more extensively than 
ER models. In part this is due to the dominance in academic finance of the neoclassical model 
of economics, in which rational self-interest is the fundamental assumption. The rational self-
interest assumption implies that financial markets are semi-strong efficient, or at least near-
semi-strong efficient. Hence, from the neoclassical perspective behavioural risk factors are not 
regarded as being of much significance. However, semi-strong efficiency is an unrealistic 
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assumption to make for the still developing markets in Shariah compliant financial securities. 
Hence it is logical to base the risk-expected return analysis of Islamic financial markets on ER 
models, which are more general, and make fewer presuppositions than the more well-studied 
APT models. In addition, extensive research in behavioural finance indicates that behavioural 
risk factors are significant in explaining securities returns, and that ER models out-perform 
APT models in terms of their explanatory and predictive power. 
  There are three steps in the development of ER models. 
 
STEP 1: The first step is the identification and evaluation of the risk factors, the Fk, to 
be used in constructing the ER model. In many ways this first step is the most important. Once 
the risk factors have been chosen, the construction and critical testing of the ER model is a 
purely technical and routine matter, involving the application of standard statistical and 
optimisation techniques. 
This paper is concerned with STEP 1, and in particular with the identification and 
evaluation of risks caused by the Shariah structures of Sukuk. 
 
STEP 2: Once the risk factors have been chosen, the ER model is constructed in STEP 
2.  The key stages in STEP 2 are using multiple regression analysis to estimate securities’ 
exposure to the risk factors, i.e. to estimate the k,A, and testing for stability of the k,A over 
time. 
 
STEP 3: Finally, in STEP 3 optimisation techniques are used to construct portfolios 
that are optimal with respect to their risk-expected return characteristics. STEP 2 tests how the 
risk factors are priced in the market. STEP 3 tests the extent to which the market mis-prices 
these risks. 
 
1.2. Methodology 
The expected returns model research programme outlined above follows the deductive 
methodology.  The grand hypothesis is: 
 
Hg: Expected returns models will be successful in explaining and predicting the returns and 
the volatilities of returns of Shariah compliant equities and Sukuk.  
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As noted above, STEP 1, the identification of the risk factors to be used in the expected 
returns model, is the most important, and the most difficult step. The importance of STEP 1 
can be seen by considering what would be the result of omitting STEP 1 and proceeding 
directly to STEP 2. Beginning with STEP 2 would mean that the regressions used in estimating 
Equation 1 would be, so-called ‘kitchen sink’ regressions, in which ‘everything is thrown at 
the model except for the kitchen sink’, i.e. the factors Fk used in a kitchen sink model include, 
more-or-less, all the factors we can think of and for which data is available. There are two 
serious drawbacks with this approach. A kitchen sink regression is very successful at fitting 
the model to the data used to estimate the model. However, this is only because so many factors 
are included in the model. The apparent explanatory power of the model disappears as soon as 
it is applied to out-of-sample data. The second drawback is more subtle. The kitchen sink 
regression will result in some of the  coefficients being significant, and some insignificant. It 
can then be hypothesised that the factors with significant  coefficients are the ‘real’ risk 
factors, while the statistically insignificant factors can be discarded. The model can then be 
cut-down to a smaller model in which only the significant factors are included. The subtle point 
is that all of the data has been used up in generating the cut-down model, i.e. all of the data has 
been used in developing a hypothesis about which risk factors are important in explaining 
security returns. The data cannot then be used to test the cut-down model, since it has already 
been used to find the cut-down model. 
This second drawback is of extreme importance for studies in Islamic finance. Islamic 
financial markets are a relatively recent development. Unlike in conventional finance, 
researchers in Islamic finance do not have long time series of data at their disposal. Hence, the 
data that is available must be used as efficiently as possible. Data should be used to test 
hypotheses, and should not be used up in merely developing hypotheses. 
The approach of this paper is to apply the meta-study method in order to generate the 
hypotheses about which risk factors are expected to be significant in an ER model. Once the 
factors have been identified the ER model can then be constructed and tested by following the 
procedures outlined in STEP 2 and STEP 3 in Section 1.1 above2. Thus, the limited data 
available will not be used up in formulating the hypotheses. 
                                                 
2 At the time of writing STEPs 2 and 3 have recently become feasible due to an agreement between the authors’ 
institution, the University of **********, and Idealratings, Inc. to undertake together a programme of joint research in 
Islamic finance. Idealratings is a leading provider of Islamic financial data, including a Shariah compliant screening and 
income purification service covering over 40,000 listed equities and virtually the entire Sukuk universe. While the data time 
series are considerably shorter and less complete than those available in conventional finance, the data resources are 
sufficient for substantial progress to be made in the research questions addressed.  
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The meta-study approach used in this paper is very common in the academic literature in 
Islamic finance, in contrast to conventional finance where empirical studies are dominant. This 
is due to the limited data that is currently available to researchers in Islamic finance, and which 
is required for conducting empirical tests. The advantage of meta-study analysis, however, is 
that the limited data available has not been consumed in formulating testable hypotheses. 
Important sources from which the secondary data is obtained include government studies, 
reports and archives, textbooks, and professional and academic journals (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill, 2007). 
The next section describes the risk concept in Islamic finance. Section 3 describes the risks 
of Sukuk, and in particular discusses risk classification schemes for Sukuk based on 
conventional bonds conceptual of product mechanism, extending the risk classification 
schemes currently used for conventional securities. The main contribution of the paper is in 
Section 4, which discusses risk classification schemes based on Sukuk structures. It is argued 
that structure based risk classifications give greater insight into Sukuk risks than adaptations 
of conventional risk classifications. This is because structure based schemes are better at 
capturing the causal links that exist between Sukuk risks and the fundamental requirement for 
Sukuk to conform to Islamic ethical principles and the Shariah. These links are summarised in 
the Sukuk risk structures matrix of Table 1. Section 5 concludes by reviewing the main 
conclusions on Sukuk risks within the wider expected returns model research programme. 
 
2. Risk in Islamic finance theory  
In the Islamic financial system risk is an essential element of profit making. Risk forms the 
basis of profit in that both profits and losses are shared in a joint enterprise. Just as profit is the 
lifeblood of the Islamic economic system, so too is the assumption of risk. Any commercial 
partnership in which the profits are shared between partners and not the risk is not a valid 
Islamic commercial transaction. Both profits and risks must be shared. 
Islam does not object to trade, nor does it simply prohibit contracts just for the sake of it. 
However, Islam is against guarantees in trade, as the Prophet Mohammed peace be upon him 
said: ‘‘al-kharaj bil-Dhaman’’, which bases the entitlement to revenue on a corresponding 
liability for bearing losses. In Shariah it is prohibited for an individual or institution to earn a 
profit without shouldering a liability. For example, the capital provider in Mudaraba, or 
Mudaraba-like transactions, is entitled to profit because all operational losses (those not caused 
by negligence or misconduct on the part of Mudarib) will be debited from his capital (mal). On 
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the other hand a lender in Qard, or risk-free loan, cannot take any compensation or reward 
from a borrower, as his loaned money is not subject to operational risks (the borrower is obliged 
to return the loan principal in full at the specified payback time). 
Iqbal (1997), Wilson (2008), Elfakhani and Hassan (2005), Asutay (2010) and Akram, 
Rafique, and Alam (2011) have all emphasised that Islamic finance structures are essentially 
profit sharing partnership schemes. Risk sharing is a component of trade, and shapes the 
behavioural norms of individuals in operationalising the system. Risk sharing shows the nature 
of the relationship between capital and work in the Islamic finance industry. In fact, this may 
be considered the best method in establishing justice between work effort and return, and 
between work effort and capital. Indeed, the participatory nature in Islamic financing methods 
is reflected in the Profit Loss Sharing theory. In Islamic financial instruments, capital and 
labour merge to establish a partnership. The requirement for risk sharing is an essential feature 
of the risk management framework for Islamic finance introduced in Junaid and Azhar (2010), 
namely, that: 
a) Transactions should be backed by real assets.  
b) Ownership of assets should be genuine, i.e. legal ownership should reflect the underlying 
economic reality.  
c) Risk depends on real asset values.  
d) Transactions should be free of Riba and Gharar.  
e) Real investment is permitted, while speculation is forbidden.  
f) Fixed, or guaranteed, rates of return are not permitted.  
While risk cannot be avoided in Islamic finance, Islam permits, and recommends, taking 
prudent precautions to mitigate risks. In particular, it is permitted to make the mitigation of 
risks one of the key aims in the design of Islamic financial instruments. In this regard issuers 
and investors view Sukuk3 with great interest. For issuers, including government agencies, 
multinational corporations, and development institutions, Sukuk help with meeting funding 
requirements for large infrastructure projects and business expansion. From the investor’s 
perspective Sukuk can reduce investment risks. The value of Sukuk is largely stable, as it is 
asset backed or at least asset based, the investment time horizon of Sukuk is fixed, further 
reducing the risk profile, and Sukuk also help investors to reduce risk through portfolio 
                                                 
3 Sukuk is the plural of Sakk. However, following many authors, this paper uses the term Sukuk for both the 
singular and plural forms. 
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diversification. Given these benefits to both issuers and investors, the high historical rates of 
growth of the Sukuk market are expected to continue for the foreseeable future.  
As far as risk identifications in Islamic finance are concerned, risk is a main pillar in Islamic 
finance life cycle because the conceptual of Islamic finance transactions based on trade 
compared to conventional finance is based on debt. In fact, risk is associated with all Islamic 
finance instruments including Sukuk. In turn, risk mechanism is based on the deeply 
understanding of risk factors and its roots in order to apply risk management and measurement 
approach.    
Despite this bright picture, Sukuk, and the Islamic finance industry in general, face several 
unique risks. Since Islamic financial institutions do not provide a guaranteed return in exchange 
for customers’ deposits or investments, investors may move their money to other financial 
institutions should the returns not match their expectations. Thus, Islamic financial institutions 
face liquidity risk, with the possibility of customers withdrawing funds too quickly. To add to 
this challenge the financial institution may also be required to pay returns to fund providers 
even if the underlying assets do not earn profits. These risks may, to some extent, be managed 
through the establishment of a liquid inter-bank market. 
In the Islamic finance system, the only means available to capitalise on a business is through 
the various modes of partnership, in which the financier provides equity capital and shares in 
the risks and rewards of the venture. The capital structure of an Islamic enterprise may itself 
act as its own risk management mechanism, since the partnership structure encourages the 
partners themselves to make the required efforts to identify, measure, and manage the risks. It 
is notable that the catastrophic failures of risk management of the Wall Street investment banks, 
culminating in the financial crisis of 2008, resulted at least in part from the abandonment of 
the partnership structure in favour of the corporate structure, which broke the mechanism for 
sharing risks and rewards that existed in the investment banking partnerships. The social and 
community ties so central to the Islamic way of life are also a means of risk management for 
individuals, households and businesses. The risk management mechanism in Islamic finance is 
based upon strong social relationships as a means of accessing help. The risk management of 
physical assets in Islamic finance, particularly for businesses, revolves around a combination 
of savings and physical risk management. Retirement benefits too are a combination of 
communal risk sharing and savings. 
In contrast to conventional investors, Islamic investors must also consider the ethical aspects 
of their investment, and the types of economic activities in which they invest (Erol, Kaynak 
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and Radi, 1990). For example, Archer and Abdel Karim (2006) point out that while the insights 
of conventional financial theory apply to Islamic investment, the restrictions which apply to 
the Islamic investor make investment at Islamic banks different from investment at 
conventional banks in several important respects:  
1. In Islam an investor must pay off his debts, and his death cannot cancel these debts. Since 
the full repayment of debts is a duty, limited liability arrangements are unacceptable in 
Islamic culture.  
2. A Muslim society would impose little tax upon profits. This would facilitate re-investment 
of profits, although there are Islamic rules about how this should be done in a partnership.  
3. Overall, an Islamic investor must avoid Riba in any form (given, charging and receiving).  
In addition, Islamic investors must also avoid forbidden economic activities which include 
producing or dealing in alcohol or drugs, unless needed for medical purposes (Segrado, 2005). 
These ethical requirements impose further dimensions of risk in Islamic finance that are 
generally not present in conventional finance.  
Therefore, this open a door =towards underpin risk identification in Islamic finance theory 
and how this identification mechanism reflects on Sukuk as its recent exiting Islamic finance 
instrument in the global finance market.    
3. Risks associated with Sukuk  
The previous section has indicated some, but not all ways, in which Sukuk may be less risky 
than their conventional counterparts. However, it is also the case that Sukuk are exposed to 
many dimensions of risk that do not arise with conventional bonds. According to the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Sukuk 
Investment Standard (17) there are 14 types of Shariah structures in Sukuk securitisation, and 
each of those structures follows a different type of sale contract that underlies the Sukuk 
securitisation. This raises the question of how to identify, evaluate and measure the risks of 
Sukuk, and develop methods for how to manage these risks. Research has seen the emergence 
of a number of risk models and risk management methods for quantifying and monitoring risk 
(Rosman, 2009). Such methods significantly augment perspectives on risks and the ability to 
control them. The following discussion develops a holistic picture of the risk of Sukuk, and 
discusses risk classification schemes based on extending and adapting certain risk classification 
schemes used in conventional finance. 
3.1 Shariah compliance risks 
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Shariah compliance risk is the risk arising from the failure of an Islamic financial instrument 
or contract to comply with the Shariah. These include the risk that already existing financial 
instruments and contracts may subsequently be declared to be Shariah non-compliant. Recently 
research focuses on Shariah compliance risks include Rosly and Sanusi (1999), Al-Amine 
(2008) and McMillen (2016) with critical evaluation of Shariah compliance risk interpretations 
among Shariah schools and parameters. For example, the application of bay al-inah 
(purchasing on credit) and bay al-dayn (sale of debt) contracts for Sukuk issuance in Malaysia, 
and criticism of the interest rate benchmarking and guarantee features in Sukuk operations, and 
Usmani (2008), with criticism of the current Sukuk mechanisms on asset ownership, guarantee, 
and Sukuk pricing benchmarks. More recently, Dusuki and Mokhtar (2010) criticise asset 
ownership in current Sukuk mechanisms, and Al-Jarhi and Abozaid (2010) discuss Shariah 
issues in current Sukuk structures in a paper presented to the OIC fiqh academy conference. 
Alsayed (2013), however, emphasises that Sukuk currently operate within an interest based 
financial system, and consequently that risk management in Sukuk is very complicated and 
difficult within the boundaries specified by the Shariah. She argues that scholars should 
therefore allow for some flexibility in structuring Sukuk. 
Shariah compliance risk is of fundamental importance in Islamic finance. Concern over the 
possible Shariah non-compliance of Islamic financial securities is widespread, and the issues 
are currently far from being resolved. 
3.2 Regulatory and supervisory frameworks  
Sukuk researchers have highlighted various risks underlying the structures of Sukuk, including 
Khan and Habib (2001), Jobst (2007), Tariq and Dar (2007), Jabeen and Javed (2007), 
Sundararajan (2007), Wilson (2009), Nanaeva (2010), Said (2011), Majid, Shahimi and 
Abdullah (2011), Alsaeed (2012), Noor and Shahimi (2013), and Alsayed (2013). Hence, this 
alerts both Sukuk issuers and investors to understand the comprehensive picture of Sukuk risk-
based supervision needed for Islamic investment, supported by a clear strategy to build up risk 
management processes at the individual institutional level, and robust legal, governance and 
market infrastructure at the national and global levels (Sundararajan, 2007).  In recognition of 
this need, the international community has established the Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB), headquartered in Kuala Lumpur, to foster good regulatory and supervisory practices, 
to help develop uniform prudential standards and support good practise in risk management 
(IFSB, 2002). 
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IFSB has advanced the work on the capital adequacy framework and risk management in 
Islamic finance institutions, through the issuance of consultative papers on these topics in 2005. 
This built a road map of risk management paths customisable with Islamic finance principles. 
In fact, the effective supervision of Islamic banks requires that the three pillars framework of 
Basel III and the language of risks it introduces be adapted appropriately to its operational 
characteristics. Such adoption of Basel III would require a medium term effort involving; i) 
Strengthening the existing supervisory framework to achieve full compliance with Basel Core 
Principles of Banking Supervision. (ii) Developing appropriate risk measurement and 
disclosure procedures supported by systematic efforts to build up databases needed for risk 
measurement; (iii) In parallel, building up the core elements of financial infrastructure and risk 
management instruments to support sound development of Islamic finance (Sundararajan, 
2007).  This will set the stage for adopting more advanced capital measurement approaches as 
envisaged in Basel III, but tailored to the specific operational characteristics of Islamic finance, 
including the role of investment instruments such as Sukuk. 
3.3 The conventional risk classification approach   
Risks associated with Islamic finance instruments, including Sukuk, can be categorised by 
adapting the risk classification procedures applied in conventional finance. El-Hawary, Grais 
and Iqbal (2004) contributed to this approach with a study presenting a basic view of each 
Islamic finance instrument’s risk profile.  The figure below shows this classification. 
Figure 1: Risk profile of Islamic finance instruments 
 
Source: El-Hawary et al., (2004) 
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Figure 1 above classifies the risks typically faced in the Islamic banks applicable to its 
investment instruments, including Sukuk. The overview of the profile of operating risks in 
Islamic finance shows risks grouped into five broad categories: transaction, business, treasury, 
governance and systemic risks (El-Hawary et al., 2004). While these categories are also 
applicable to non-Islamic finance, specific risks within them are more relevant to Islamic 
finance, and the nature of contracts it uses. However, the nature of differences between Islamic 
finance instruments requires a precise listed risk profile to each Islamic finance instrument in 
order to gain a more accurate reading of those risk measurements on these instruments. 
3.4 The stakeholder risk classification approach   
It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the nature of different features of investment 
instruments according to inherited features of Shariah principles. In the Sukuk context, IFSB 
Standard 7 of (2005) emphasises that Islamic finance institutions may act in various capacities 
in a Sukuk securitisation. Its exposure to risks may be similar to that of conventional bond 
securitisation. However, Shariah rules and principles may add an extra dimension to the 
existing risk exposures and may have a material effect on the risk profile of Sukuk holders. 
This implies differences between Sukuk and bonds.  
As well as the fact that the risk profile of Sukuk is unique, recognition of Sukuk risks is 
quite complex due to the innovation of Sukuk structures. Tariq and Dar (2007) presented risk 
characteristics of each type of Sukuk structure from a certificate type perspective by linking 
them with the Shariah structures underlying the Sukuk type. There were eight risk factors 
presenting the relationship of those risks and types of Sukuk: credit risk, rate of return risk, 
foreign exchange risk, price risk, liquidity risk, business risk, Shariah compliance risk and 
infrastructure rigidities. In addition, IFSB Standard 7 (2005) recognised a Sukuk structure risk 
profile based on the Sukuk stakeholder’s perspective. The standard listed five stakeholders of 
Sukuk who are exposed the risk of Sukuk. Those are originator, servicer, issuer, SPV and 
holder (investor). Categorising Sukuk risk based on the Sukuk stakeholder perspectives 
provides an easier way to track those risks. Also, this helps to present a comprehensive picture 
of the risks associated with Sukuk securitisation. Figure 2 below illustrates those risks 
discussed in the previous research. 
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Figure 2: Risk Exposure to Sukuk Stakeholders  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Created by IFSB standard 7 (2005) and developed by Authors (2015) 
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It is noticeable that Sukuk designs its risk according to Sukuk structure as securitisation 
mechanism as the risk picture is in horizontal stream over the natural structure of Sukuk 
compared to conventional bonds risk goes vertical over the natural structure of conventional 
bonds as it may appeared  the figure below.    
In fact, the stakeholder approach provides a valuable framework for understanding and 
interpreting the risks associated with Sukuk. The advantages of the stakeholder risk 
classification for Sukuk can be seen by comparing it with the risk classification scheme for 
conventional bonds of Fabozzi and Dattatreya (2005). In the conventional classification bond 
risks are classified by cash flow risks and market value risks. The conventional bond risk 
classification is less informative than the stakeholder model in linking the various Sukuk risks 
with the factors causing those risks. The figure below shows the conventional bond 
classification in a simple context.  
 
Figure 3: Bond Risks Scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Created by Fabozzi & Dattatreya (2005) and developed by Authors (2015)4. The 
Sukuk structure risk classification approach  
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4.1 Risk underlying Sukuk structures  
The aim of this study is to shine new light on Sukuk risk analysis through an examination of 
financial risk among Sukuk structures. Hence, a determination and interpretation of the above 
Figures 2 and 3, and the difference between Sukuk risk profiles and bond risk profiles are made.  
Referring to previous studies conducted on risks of Sukuk structures such as Fabozzi (2000), 
Usmani (2008), Tariq and Dar (2007), Abdul Rahman (2008), Abdul Jalil and Abdul Raham 
(2012), Alsaeed (2012), Noor and Shahimi (2013), and Alsyed (2013), there is necessary room 
for gathering those risks and listing them for every structure of Sukuk. Sukuk structures can be 
classified in different categories, such as debt based, equity based, assets based, and agency 
based as well as a hybrid group which combines two or more structures within a single Sukuk 
certificate. For examples, debt based Sukuk such as Murabahah and Istisna’a, equity based 
such as Musharakah and Mudarabah, assets based such as Ijarah and Manfah (usufructs), and 
agency based such as Wakala structure.  
This classification might provide a better reading of risks underlying Sukuk structures to 
track risks and estimate the reward measurement of each structure. In addition, this matrix, 
sourced from the past research in this field, helps Sukuk research analysts to figure out the 
comparison and differences as well as to help bridge the research gap in Sukuk risk analysis. 
The table below summarises the risks attached with each Sukuk structure. In terms of the 
methodology of the expected returns research programme discussed in Section 1, the table 
should be regarded as summarising a set of hypotheses on the expected signs, sizes and 
statistical significance of the coefficients to be obtained from the proposed multiple regression 
analysis. 
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Table1: Sukuk Structures Risks Matrix  
Sukuk Structures types 
Asset Based Debt Based Equity Based Agency Based 
Applicable 
Scale of 
level 
Risk 
Recognition 
Applicable 
Scale of 
level 
Risk 
Recognition 
Applicable 
Scale of 
level 
Risk 
Recognition 
Applicable 
Scale of 
level 
Risk 
Recognition 
Yes. In 
particular, on 
rent 
payment, 
fixed rate 
More 
serious 
Medium Yes 
Most 
serious  
High Yes 
Less 
serious  
Low Yes 
Less 
serious 
Low 
(Interest rate 
risk) Yes 
More 
serious 
Medium Yes 
Most 
serious 
High Yes 
Less 
serious 
Low Yes 
Less 
serious 
Low 
If all other conditions are similar. FX risk will be the same for all types of Sukuk structure. However, those Sukuk that are liquid or relatively short term in nature will be less 
exposed. The composition of assets in the pool will also contribute to the FX risk in different ways.  
Yes 
Most 
serious 
High Yes 
Most 
serious 
High Yes 
Less 
serious 
Low Yes  
More 
serious 
Medium 
Yes 
More 
serious 
Medium Yes 
Most 
serious 
High Yes 
More 
serious 
Medium Yes 
More 
serious 
Medium 
risks 
Yes 
Most 
serious 
High 
No, there is 
no asset 
attached  
- - Yes 
Less 
serious 
Low Yes 
More 
serious 
Medium 
Risk rating          
 
High = Red,   Medium = Yellow,  Low = Green  (These rating hypotheses are obtained by 
analysing and extending the results of the previous research studies discussed in this paper)
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4.2 Evaluation of risk profiles underlying Sukuk Structures  
Figure 4: Risk roots in Sukuk structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Created by Webb, P. (1996), Reilly & Brown (2012) and developed by Authors 
(2015) 
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encounter vary according to the structure of the Sukuk. For example, the risks of Sukuk 
Murabahah, which has a fixed return, differ from those of Sukuk Musharakah; the risks of 
Sukuk Istisna differ from those of Sukuk Ijarah; and so on. It is important to state that these 
risks also vary depending on the underlying assets of these Sukuk, be they fixed or movable 
assets, utilities or services.  
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is in conjunction with serval influence mainly Shariah rules driver. As it seen in figure 4 the 
R
a
te o
f R
etu
rn
 
R
isk (In
terest 
R
a
te R
isk) 
A
sset rela
ted
 
risks 
C
red
it R
isk 
(R
isk o
f 
d
efa
u
lt) 
L
eg
isla
tive risk 
F
o
reig
n
 
exch
a
n
g
e (F
X
) 
R
isk 
R
eg
u
la
to
ry risk 
S
h
a
ria
h
 
C
o
m
p
lia
n
ce 
R
isk 
S
ta
ff rela
ted
 
risk 
L
iq
u
id
ity R
isk 
S
tru
ctu
re risk
  
Risk Strategies  
Diversification Hedging 
Risk 
based 
Sukuk 
risks 
types 
Sukuk 
Risk 
Drivers 
What is risk look at?  
Reilly & Brown, 
( 2012) 
Webb 
(1996) 
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risk story of Sukuk is built on the conceptual of conventional bonds. The figure explains risk 
factors that exposure Sukuk over securitisation life cycle.  
As Sukuk risk as research concern, screening Sukuk platforms and follows is important to 
draw holistic picture of Sukuk risk factor and its follows over securitisation of Sukuk as this 
clearly attempt to display in the above matrix and figure.  
 
4.2 Empirical studies on Sukuk structure risks  
A few studies have been conducted on Sukuk structure analysis. One of these studies 
conducted by Abdul Jalil and Abdul Raham (2012) was about a comparison analysis between 
two Sukuk structures in terms of long term tenure. They determine that the amount of profit 
gained from the musharakah mutanagisah structure using a coupon rate of 4.5 %, priced at par 
with a tenure of five years was greater than the Ijarah structure where the price is at a discount. 
In addition, they computed and compared the profits obtained from Sukuk investment in Ijarah 
and musharakah mutanagisah for a 3.5% coupon rate and price at par for a Sukuk with tenure 
of 12.5, 15, 17.5 and 19 years. They applied these two models for computing the profit. These 
models are based on Ijarah and Musharahkah mutanaqish principles. They found that Sukuk 
investment using the Ijarah principle is a better investment compared with the Musharahkah 
mutanaqish principle, regardless of the number of years of the Sukuk, as long as it is a long 
term tenure. 
Tariq and Dar (2007) and Zaidi (2009) discussed the Sukuk structures and both investigated 
the risk associated. Zaidi (2009) concluded that the risk of Sukuk is broader than the risk of 
conventional bonds, due to Sukuk being burdened with additional risk factors, including Sukuk 
specific market risks, Shariah risk, regulatory risks, and risk factors associated with the assets 
underlying Sukuk. Tariq and Dar (2007) provided a Shariah compliant framework applying to 
Sukuk structures in order to contribute to risk mitigation.  
Wilson (2008) addresses the criticisms of Sukuk Ijarah related to linking distribution to 
LIBOR. He examines innovations in the structuring of Sukuk securities and the potential for 
novel structures based on Musharakah or a hybrid of different Sukuk structures. Wilson also 
proposes adopting alternative benchmarks to LIBOR based on macroeconomic indicators of 
real activity such as GDP growth for sovereign Sukuk, and of company financial performance 
in the case of corporate Sukuk. However, GDP indicators may help in the case of Sukuk based 
on debt or assets, though not for Sukuk based on equity, because the former Sukuk rely on the 
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economic environment, the context of the Sukuk issuer, and the assets attached to the Sukuk, 
while Sukuk based on equity are more affected by the efforts of Sukuk parties such as mudarb 
(entrepreneur manager) who plays a crucial role in driving Sukuk mudaraba among its risk 
exposures.  
Saad and Mohamad (2012) analysed Sukuk structure performance in the Malaysian market 
from 2005 till 2010. They used a multivariate regression model for the analysis to investigate 
the relationship between Sukuk yield and Sukuk structures. They concluded that there is a 
statistically significant relationship among variables. Most of the listed Sukuk are based on 
debt (68%), and the majority come from the infrastructure and utilities sectors (53%). 
Muhamed and Radzi (2011) identified the implications for Sukuk investors choosing an 
asset based or asset backed structure, focusing on the Sukuk Ijarah structure as a case study. 
A default on asset based Sukuk is the same to investors as a default on unsecured bonds. No 
recourse can be expected against any of the assets used in the Sukuk. On the other hand, asset 
backed Sukuk may become more widely used as investors would have the ability to take 
possession of the assets backing the Sukuk. They concluded that asset based Sukuk may be 
more suitable where legal title to assets cannot be transferred to investors. The asset based 
Sukuk is more appropriate when there are restrictions on foreign ownership of certain asset 
classes such as property assets. In addition, asset backed Sukuk may not be adequate in 
circumstances where the enforceability of assets may provide a challenge, such as sovereign 
owned assets. 
4.3 Managing Sukuk structure risks  
Sukuk provide opportunities for financial innovation, not all of which are available for 
conventional bonds. While Sukuk are exposed to certain risks beyond those born by 
conventional bonds, Sukuk financing also provides for new ways of managing these risks, and 
for tailoring Sukuk instruments to the particular needs of issuers and investors. Some 
contributions to financial innovation in Sukuk markets are discussed below.    
Considering the nature of Sukuk structures from the Shariah perspective, it is seen that the 
evolution of structures such as Sukuk Ijarah has been instrumental in increasing Sukuk issue 
size for issuers. Structures such as agency Sukuk (Wakalah) have allowed issuers to maximize 
the use of limited tangibles in an issuance, and thus allowed them to issue a larger quantum 
than if they had used an Ijarah structure. In practise, issuers like Ooredoo have used other real 
tangible assets such as airtime minutes via a Manfah (usufructs) structure under the Ijarah 
concept (Zawya, 2014).  
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Sukuk are based on the Shariah principles, which, when applied properly, allow avoiding 
many risks associated with traditional financial instruments. However, since Islamic financial 
institutions have to function in traditional financial markets, and due to the imperfection of 
modern Islamic instruments, avoidance of many risks is impossible. While conventional bond 
holders have a variety of instruments to manage their risks, not all of these instruments are 
permissible for Islamic finance institutions. For example, there is an on-going discussion in the 
academic literature about permissibility of using options in Islamic finance. While most 
derivatives are clearly prohibited by Shariah scholars, there are some options that can be 
attached to certain Islamic financial instruments. Smolarski and Tahir (2006) argue that call 
and put options can be used for hedging purposes. Obaidullah (2004) analyses options by 
stipulation and option of determination as possible risk management instruments in Islamic 
finance. Tariq and Dar (2007) suggest using embedded options as a tool for Sukuk risk 
reduction. They argue that Shariah, while prohibiting debt trade, allows its exchange for real 
goods, assets and services. Thus, a Sukuk holder can have an option to exchange his zero-
coupon Istisna’a Sukuk, for example, to an apartment (after a certain period) instead of waiting 
for maturity. The same authors (Tariq and Dar, 2007) discuss the possibility of swapping 
floating-rate Sukuk with zero-coupon-fixed-rate-embedded Sukuk as a Shariah compliant 
instrument. Most of the authors argue that options allow for decreasing excessive risk 
(Gharar), which should be avoided under Shariah ruling, but are present at the current highly 
volatile market. While many academics agree that such detachable and non-trading options 
should be permitted in Islamic finance, and urge Shariah scholars to come up with a collective 
fatwa on this point, the latter are very reluctant to give such permission. 
In 2007 Dubai’s Ports Customs and Free Zone Corporation issued the world’s first 
convertible Sukuk allowing to convert initial Sukuk into common shares of the originator. In 
2007 Khazanah National (Malaysia) issued exchangeable Sukuk with an option to exchange 
them to existing shares of one of the subsidiaries of the originator. These issues attracted high 
interest both from investors as well as potential issuers of Sukuk as examples of risk reduction 
alternatives. While financial experts discuss the possibility of further innovation in Sukuk, such 
as mandatory exchangeable/convertibles, contingent-convertible Sukuk, reserve convertible 
Sukuk, etc., most of the scholars have forbidden these kinds of innovations (Abdullah and 
Ismail, 2008), due to their similarity with derivatives and their perceived excessive uncertainty. 
Another on-going discussion among scholars is about permissibility of third party 
guarantees in some Sukuk issues (Hassan and Soumaré, 2007). Proponents of such guarantees, 
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usually issued by the governments, claim that there is no clear prohibition of such action in any 
Islamic source. Thus, according to this discussion, as long as the guarantor is financially and 
legally independent from both contracting parties involved in the Sukuk transaction, the third 
party can guarantee the entire investment or part of it without obtaining any fees for this 
operation. Opponents of such a guarantee argue that it can open the possibility for Riba and 
highlight the Shariah prohibition of any kind of guarantee of the capital (Al-Amine, 2008). 
While this paper has focussed on Sukuk structure risks, the conventional risk classifications 
discussed in Section 3 are also of value in identifying, measuring and managing Sukuk risks. 
Thus, risk management for Sukuk can borrow from the general risk management theory in 
conventional finance, for example, as discussed by Reilly and Brown (2012). In this regard, Al 
Sayed (2013) concluded in her paper that conventional risk management, variance for total risk 
and the Beta coefficient for systematic risk, can be used to measure total risk and systematic 
risk of Sukuk. In addition, the conventional risk management strategies of diversification and 
hedging are applicable to the management of Sukuk risk. The multifactor expected returns 
models discussed in Section 1 combine the insights and techniques of conventional finance 
with those derived from the risk analysis of Sukuk structures. Indeed, it is hypothesised that 
structure risk factors will be highly significant in the proposed expected return regressions of 
STEP 2 of Section 1.  
5. Conclusion  
A number of schemes for the classification of Sukuk risks based on extending and adapting 
the risk classification schemes used in conventional finance have been proposed in the 
literature. A recent development has been the development of risk classifications based on 
Sukuk structures. It is argued that Sukuk structure risk classifications provide a better way of 
linking Sukuk risks with the fundamental factors causing those risks. Further, the different 
Sukuk structures follow directly from the fundamental ethical principles underlying Islamic 
finance. Thus, Sukuk structure risk classifications are theoretically superior to conventional 
classification schemes, since structure risks are created by the necessity for Sukuk to conform 
to the Shariah. Sukuk structure risks are essentially Shariah created risks. The evaluation of 
the structure risks of the Sukuk structure risk classification scheme proposed in this paper are 
summarised in Table 1. 
Structure risks do not exhaust all the dimensions of risk to which Sukuk are exposed. Very 
general models for explaining and predicting Sukuk returns are the multifactor expected returns 
models discussed in Section 1. It is hypothesised that structure risks will be highly significant, 
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both statistically and economically, when included in the risk factors of an expected returns 
model. The empirical testing of this hypothesis is continued in the sequel. 
Given the short data time series currently available to researchers in Islamic finance, 
empirical tests of expected returns models cannot yet be conducted to the same degree of rigour 
as in conventional finance. For example, it is not possible to properly test for the stability of 
coefficients in STEP 2 of Section 1, given the current data. Nevertheless, no data has been used 
up in hypothesis formation, due to the meta-study approach used in this paper to develop the 
hypotheses.  This means that the proposed empirical testing can now be carried out to an 
acceptable level of statistical rigour. 
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